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Abstract
In four studies, we addressed whether group membership influences behavioral and neural responses to the social
exclusion of others. Participants played a modified three-player Cyberball game (Studies 1–3) or a team-selection task
(Study 4) in the absence or presence of a minimal group setting. In the absence of a minimal group, when one player
excluded another player, participants actively included the excluded target. When the excluder was from the in-group and
the excluded player from the out-group, participants were less likely to intervene (Studies 1–3) and also more often went
along with the exclusion (Study 4). Functional magnetic resonance imaging results (Study 3) showed that greater exclusion
in the minimal group setting concurred with increased activation in the dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex, a region associated
with overriding cognitive conflict. Self-reports from Study 4 supported these results by showing that participants’ responses
to the target’s exclusion were motivated by group membership as well as participants’ general aversion to exclude others.
Together, the findings suggest that when people witness social exclusion, group membership triggers a motivational
conflict between favoring the in-group and including the out-group target. This underscores the importance of group
composition for understanding the dynamics of social exclusion.
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Jumping on the ‘bad’wagon? How group
membership influences responses to the social
exclusion of others
Previous research on social exclusion strongly focused on its
detrimental effects for victims (Williams, 2007), but the answer
to the question why people exclude others and under which cir-
cumstances remains inconclusive (e.g. Wesselmann et al., 2013).
The scarce research on the decision to include vs exclude has
shown that inclusion is the norm in most social situations (Kerr
et al., 2008) and that explicit instructions to ostracize others
induce emotional distress (Zadro et al., 2005). Still, social exclu-
sion occurs frequently among both children (Wang et al., 2010)
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and adults (Williams, 2007), underscoring the need to better
understand the factors driving social exclusion. In this light,
it is important to consider that exclusion is typically a group
effort. To understand the dynamics of social exclusion, it is thus
important to incorporate this group context and not only focus
on the initiator of exclusion but also examine how others within
the group react in turn. These other group members might inter-
vene by trying to again include the excluded target, observe the
situation without addressing the exclusion or actively go along
with the exclusion (Malti et al., 2015). Different motives may
underlie the decision to intervene or not, such as the motivation
to include the excluded target because of exclusion aversion
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exclusion. These motives are not mutually exclusive and can
create a dilemma for people when deciding how to respond to
the exclusion of a target. The main goal of the current research
was to study whether social inclusion norms toward the target
could emerge without group conformity norms to reciprocate
the excluder. Thus, group membership may play a central role
in encouraging the decision to include the target or favor the
excluder.
There are many arguments for why group membership
should affect social exclusion. Prior research has shown that
in-group members are seen as more similar in attitudes and
values than out-group members and that this shapes our social
interactions (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). People have more affinity
for in-group members and tend to favor them over out-group
members (Hewstone et al., 2002). Out-group members, compared
to in-group members, elicit less trust (Voci, 2006). Moreover, we
grant fewer resources (Tajfel et al., 1971) and offer less help to
out-group members (Levine et al., 2002). Group membership may
thus be a key determinant of social exclusion dynamics.
Surprisingly, research has so far mainly considered the
effects of group membership on ‘victims’ of social exclusion.
This research has shown that social exclusion leads to pain
and distress, regardless of whether it was initiated by an in-
group or out-group member (Williams et al., 2000; Smith and
Williams, 2004) or even a strongly disliked out-group member
(Gonsalkorale and Williams, 2007, although see Wirth and
Williams, 2009; Bernstein et al., 2010; Goodwin et al., 2010, for
a more nuanced perspective). Little research, however, has
addressed the effects of group membership on the process of
exclusion itself. In one exception, Vrijhof et al. (2016) examined
responses to the social exclusion of in-group and out-group
members among adolescents. They found that adolescents
generally applied a strong inclusion norm; they actively tried
to include both in-group and out-group members, even though
adolescents’ empathic concern was associated more with the
inclusion of in-group members than with the inclusion of out-
group members. This study provided a first step in examining
the effects of group membership on the process of exclusion, but
with mixed results for adolescents’ motives vs actual behavior.
It is moreover still an open question how group membership
affects reactions to social exclusion among adults or what the
underlying (brain) mechanisms are for different reactions to
social exclusion. To address this hiatus, in the first three studies,
we investigated people’s behavioral and brain responses to the
exclusion of another individual using a modified three-player
Cyberball game (a computerized ball-tossing game; Williams
et al., 2000). Exclusion was programmed such that one player
(the excluder) threw the ball consistently to the participant at
the cost of another player (the excluded target). To manipulate
group membership, we used a minimal group paradigm, which
creates groups based on arbitrary dimensions, thereby reducing
any bias from existing knowledge about specific social groups
(Tajfel, 1970). In this minimal group, the excluder was always the
in-group and the excluded target the out-group. By manipulating
group membership through self-selection (Study 1) as well as
random assignment (Studies 2 and 3), we moreover tested the
robustness of its effects.
We chose the perspective of a group member that does not
initiate the exclusion but responds to the exclusion initiated by
another group member, because bullying research has shown
that such facilitatory actions substantially reinforce the negative
experience of bullying (Espelage et al., 2007). Also, people who
observe bullying of out-group victims, compared to in-group
victims, hold less negative attitudes toward in-group aggressors
(Nesdale et al., 2013) and less often intervene (Palmer et al., 2015).
In the current research, we addressed whether similar dynamics
apply to social exclusion. We reasoned that group members
could react to social exclusion in three ways: (1) by going along
with the exclusion of the target (by reducing the number of
throws to the excluded player), (2) by compensating and actively
including the target (increasing throws to the excluded player) or
(3) by doing neither (dividing tosses equally among the two play-
ers). Whereas the latter (on-the-fence) option does not involve
an active exclusion, it could still be considered facilitatory since
the excluded player ends up receiving fewer balls than equal
distribution norms propose.
We moreover predicted participants’ responses to the social
exclusion of another individual to be determined by the salience
of the players’ group membership, something we addressed
by means of our minimal group manipulation. In the absence
of such information, we expected participants to compensate
because of the strong inclusion norm (Zadro and Gonsalkorale,
2014). However, when we make group membership salient, and
when an in-group member initiates the exclusion of an out-
group member, we expected that this could create a dilemma
in participants between favoring the in-group and avoiding the
exclusion of the out-group target. That is, whereas participants
may feel it is normative to not exclude others (Wesselmann et al.,
2013), people may at the same time wish to reciprocate and favor
the exclusionary behavior of the in-group member (Gaertner
and Insko, 2000). As a consequence, we expected participants
to remain unbiased and divide tosses equally among the two
players.
This motivational conflict is likely moderated by one’s iden-
tification with one’s in-group (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), such
that the stronger this identification, the more participants are
inclined to reciprocate an in-group excluder as opposed to com-
pensating an excluded out-group target. To examine this, we
additionally assessed participants’ felt connection with the in-
group vs out-group player in the minimal group setting and
examined their relation with participants’ tossing behavior, with
greater relative in-group identification predicted to concur with
reduced compensation.
In addition, in Study 3, we assessed to what extent cognitive
conflict concurred with the activation of the two opposing
motives (i.e. to include the out-group vs to favor the in-group)
when participants witnessed social exclusion in a minimal
group setting. Because this conflict is not necessarily expressed
in people’s ultimate choices for exclusion vs inclusion, and
because people are not always able to report on the conflict
they experience while making a decision, we used functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to assess participants’ real-
time brain indices of cognitive conflict during the Cyberball
game. A large body of neuroimaging literature points to the
central role of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and the
dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex (dlPFC; Van Veen and Carter, 2006;
Botvinick, 2007) across tasks involving simple stimulus-response
rules (Van Veen and Carter, 2005), as well as more complex social
dynamics, like moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004), unethical
behavior (Lelieveld et al., 2016) and social rejection (Somerville
et al., 2006). Accordingly, these were our regions of interest (ROI)
to test the assertion that a minimal group setting induces greater
conflict resulting from the inclusion norm toward the out-
group member competing with the norm to favor the in-group
member.
In the first three studies, we used the Cyberball paradigm
to examine people’s responses to the social exclusion of others.
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to social exclusion with another paradigm, to see whether
the findings of the first three studies translate to a different
group setting that involved a team-selection task. In this
paradigm (adjusted from Doolaard et al., 2020), participants
are instructed to perform an estimation task in a team of four
members. Following a practice round but before the actual game
begins, participants are given the opportunity to adjust the
composition of their team by excluding one of the other three
players. This paradigm enabled us to study social exclusion in
a larger group (i.e. a group of four). Moreover, in addition to
the gradual act of social exclusion in the first three studies,
operationalized as the relative number of throws to each
other player, this paradigm allowed us to study how group
membership affects the binary decision to include or exclude
a member of the team. Finally, in Study 4 we assessed different
motives underlying participants’ responses to social exclusion
using self-report measures, to further examine whether people
experienced conflict between the norm for inclusion and
in-group-favoritism.
In four studies, involving behavioral as well as brain mea-
sures, we thus investigated the effect of group membership
on compensating vs facilitating social exclusion of others and
the dilemma people may experience when deciding between
these two options. The first two studies involved a between-
participant manipulation of inclusionary status (inclusion vs
exclusion) and group membership (minimal group vs control)
within an adjusted version of the Cyberball game. We thus
examined how people respond to the exclusion of an individual
in the absence vs presence of a minimal group setting. In the
third neuroimaging study, we extended this setup and used an
fMRI-compatible experimental design with inclusionary status
as within-subjects factor and group membership as between-
subjects factor. This allowed us to study the brain mechanisms
underlying people’s reactions to social exclusion in the presence
and absence of a minimal group. In a final study, we examined
participants’ responses to social exclusion in a different group
setting where people could adjust the composition of a team,
using a between-participant manipulation of the order of the
exclusion decision (initiating vs responding to the decision) and
group membership (minimal group vs control).
Study 1
Method
Design and participants. The study used a 2 (inclusionary status,
inclusion vs exclusion) × 2 (group membership, minimal group
vs control) between-participants design. Our sample size was
determined based on a power analysis revealing that 128 partic-
ipants were required to detect a medium effect size (Cohen’s
d = 0.50) at the 5% level with a power of 0.80. One hundred
twenty-six undergraduates from Leiden University (75 women,
51 men; Mage = 20.88, SDage = 2.31) eventually participated. They
were recruited from the faculties of humanities, medicine, law,
and science, but not from the faculty of social sciences, to
ensure unfamiliarity with Cyberball. Participants were randomly
assigned to the four conditions. All materials and datasets
used in our studies are publicly available on the Open Science
Framework, using the following link: https://osf.io/39gxr/?vie
w_only=57d747f50cad4dc7bc0c1caf770d1f67.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were led to a cubicle
and received further instructions via the computer screen.
Participants played a three-player Cyberball game (Williams
et al., 2000), a computerized ball-tossing game. Originally, the
game was programmed such that the participant was the
exclusion target and would at some point stop receiving the
ball. We modified this setup, such that now one of the virtual
players was excluded by having the other player throw all balls
to the participant (for a similar version, see Riem et al., 2013).
Participants were told they were to play a game of Cyber-
ball with two others over the Internet. They learned that they
were Player C, and the others were Players A and B. Partic-
ipants were unaware that the behavior of the other players
was pre-programmed. In the inclusion condition, Player A was
programmed to throw the ball 50% of the times to the participant
(Player C) and 50% of the times to Player B. In the exclusion
condition, Player A threw the ball 100% of the times to the
participant, thereby fully excluding Player B. In all conditions,
Player B was programmed to at all times throw the ball 50%
of the time to the participant and 50% of the time to Player A,
thus displaying no biased behavior toward any of the other two
players. The percentage of ball tosses from the participant to
Player B (the exclusion target) comprised our main dependent
variable. We calculated this as 100 (NCB/NTotal), where NCB is the
number of throws from the participant to Player B and NTotal is
the total number of throws. Both games proceeded for 45 throws
in total (from all three players).
Before the game started, participants chose their avatar to be
blue, yellow, or green as a basis for our minimal group manip-
ulation. In the minimal group condition, Player A’s color was
matched to the participant’s choice, whereas Player B was given
a different color. For instance, if the participant chose the color
blue, Player A would also be blue, but player B would be yellow
(see Figure 1A). In the control condition where group member-
ship was absent, all players were assigned a different color. For
instance, if a participant chose the color blue, Player A would be
green and Player B yellow (see Figure 1B).
Following Cyberball, participants received a manipulation
check of our minimal group manipulation. Participants indi-
cated for Players A and B separately how connected they felt
to them (i.e. ‘To what extent did you feel connected to Player
A/B?’, ‘I had a lot in common with Player A/B’, and ‘Player A/B
was a member of my group’), all on seven-point Likert scales
(1 = ‘not at all’; 7 = ‘very strongly’). We averaged responses into
a single index of perceived group membership (αPlayer A = 0.80;
αPlayer B = 0.78). See the supplemental material for other questions
we asked, including results.
Participants next estimated the number of tosses Player B
had received in both the inclusion and exclusion games, as a
manipulation check of our exclusion manipulation. At the end
of the session, participants were debriefed, were paid e1.50 and
thanked for their participation. All procedures were approved




Perceived group membership. A 2 (inclusionary status) × 2 (group
membership) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the perceived
group membership ratings of Player A yielded only a main effect
of group membership, F(1, 122) = 9.01, P = 0.003, partial η2 = 0.07,
indicating that independent of whether participants took part in
an inclusion game or an exclusion game, participants identified
more with Player A when they both had the same color (M = 4.36,
SD = 1.50), rather than when they had a different color (M = 3.54,
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Fig. 1. The group membership manipulation used in Studies 1–3. Participants in the minimal group condition (Figure 1A) played a game of Cyberball where they (Player
C) had the same color as the person initiating the exclusion (Player A), but the target (Player B) had a different color. Participants in the control condition (Figure 1B)
played a game where all three players had different colors.
ratings of Player B also only revealed a main effect of group
membership, F(1, 122) = 6.05, P = 0.015, partial η2 = 0.05, indicating
that when only Player B had a different color, participants iden-
tified less with Player B (M = 3.25, SD = 1.28) than when all players
had a different color (M = 3.86, SD = 1.47). Together, these results
confirm that our minimal group manipulation was effective.
Perceived exclusion of target. A 2 × 2 ANOVA only showed a main
effect of inclusionary status, F(1, 122) = 46.60, P < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.28. Participants thought Player B received fewer balls in
the exclusion game (M = 12.19, SD = 3.07) than in the inclusion
game (M = 15.52, SD = 2.42), confirming the effectiveness of the
exclusion manipulation.
Ball tosses to target. A 2 × 2 ANOVA showed a significant main
effect of inclusionary status, F(1, 122) = 12.53, P = 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.09, qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 122) = 6.35,
P = 0.013, partial η2 = 0.05 (see Table 1 for means and standard
deviations (s.d.)). In the inclusion games, the number of tosses
in the group membership conditions did not differ, t(122) = −.68,
P = 0.500, Cohen’s d = 0.20, 95% CI [−0.07–0.03], suggesting that
group membership alone did not affect the number of throws
to the two other players. But in the exclusion games, group
membership did influence participants’ ball-tossing behavior;
they less frequently tossed the ball to the excluded target in
the minimal group condition than in the control condition,
t(122) = 2.90, P = 0.004, Cohen’s d = 0.64, 95% CI [0.02–0.12], as pre-
dicted. Moreover, participants actively compensated for the tar-
get’s exclusion in the control condition, with their percentage
of tosses toward the target significantly exceeding the even
distribution of 50%, t(33) = 6.51, P < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.22, 95% CI
[0.07–0.14]. Such compensation was not observed in the mini-
mal group condition, t(29) = 1.42, P = 0.165, Cohen’s d = 0.23, 95%
CI [−0.01–0.08].
Group identification and tosses to the target. To examine whether
the strength of identification with in-group Player A relative
to out-group Player B was associated with participants’ tossing
behavior in the minimal group condition, we correlated differ-
ence scores between the perceived group membership of Player
A and Player B with the percentage of ball tosses to Player B. For
our hypotheses, it was important to use the difference score,
instead of the identification with Players A and B separately,
as it allowed us to investigate the throwing behavior of partic-
ipants who were the most affected by our manipulation (and
thus identified more with Player A while at the same time less
with Player B). This correlation was significantly negative in the
minimal group condition (r = −0.18, P = 0.049), indicating that the
stronger the felt connection with the in-group excluder relative
to the out-group target, the fewer balls participants threw to
the excluded target. This correlation was non-significant in the
control condition (r = −.09, P = 0.463).
Discussion
Study 1 provided initial evidence that a simple minimal group
manipulation made participants compensate less for the exclu-
sion of a target in Cyberball, whereas they actively compensated
for the exclusion in the absence of a minimal group setting. The
more participants identified with the excluder than the excluded
target in a minimal group setting, the less likely they were to
compensate.
To replicate the results of Study 1, and to rule out that
shared preferences drove group membership perceptions
(Festinger, 1957) due to the overlap of their color preferences with
those of another player, in a second study, the Cyberball players
were assigned a color, instead of choosing this themselves (see
Dunham et al., 2011), providing an even more stringent test of
the notion that a minimal group setting affects reactions to the
social exclusion of others.
Study 2
Method
Design and participants. The study again involved a 2 (inclusion-
ary status, inclusion vs exclusion) × 2 (group membership, mini-
mal group vs control) between-participants design. Using similar
selection criteria as in Study 1, we aimed for the inclusion of
128 participants. One hundred twenty-two undergraduates from
Leiden University (84 women, 38 men; Mage = 20.63, SDage = 2.19)
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Table 1. Percentage of ball tosses to the excluded player as a function of inclusionary status and group membership (Study 1)
Inclusion Exclusion
M SD M SD
Minimal group 51.54%a 9.36 53.35%a 12.90
Control 49.84%a 7.35 60.57%b 9.46
Note: Means with different superscripts differ significantly across all cells (Ps < 0.05, analyzed with simple-effect analyses).
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Study 1, except that the
players’ colors were now pre-programmed by the experimenter,
without any accompanying information. As depicted in Figure 1,
the participant (Player C) was always assigned the color blue and
Player B the color yellow. In the minimal group condition, Player
A was assigned the same color as the participant (i.e. blue) and a
different color than both other players (i.e. green) in the control
condition.
After playing the Cyberball game, participants responded to
the same three items from Study 1 measuring perceived group
membership of Player A (α = 0.83) and Player B (α = 0.76) and their
estimated number of throws to Players A and B.
Results
Manipulation checks
Perceived group membership. A 2 (inclusionary status) × 2 (group
membership) ANOVA of perceived group membership ratings of
Player A yielded only a main effect of group membership, F(1,
118) = 6.31, P = 0.013, partial η2 = 0.05, indicating that participants
identified more with Player A when they had the same color
(M = 4.13, SD = 1.42) than a different color (M = 3.48, SD = 1.42).
A main effect of group membership on the ratings of Player
B, F(1, 118) = 8.03, P = 0.005, partial η2 = 0.06, further indicated
that participants identified less with Player B in the minimal
group condition (M = 3.39, SD = 1.03) than in the control condition
(M = 3.99, SD = 1.31), confirming the effectiveness of our group
membership manipulation.
Perceived exclusion of target. As expected, the 2 × 2 ANOVA
showed a main effect of inclusionary status, F(1, 118) = 11.64,
P = 0.001, partial η2 = 0.09. Participants estimated Player B to
have received fewer balls in the exclusion game (M = 12.78,
SD = 5.45) than in the inclusion game (M = 15.37, SD = 2.84). The
ANOVA also yielded a main effect of group membership, F(1,
118) = 6.20, P = 0.014, partial η2 = 0.05, indicating that participants
thought Player B received fewer balls in the minimal group
condition (M = 13.15, SD = 3.00) than in the control condition
(M = 15.02, SD = 5.45) irrespective of whether this was the
in- or exclusion condition. Because this main effect was
unexpected, we conducted follow-up planned comparisons
to examine the differences between the specific conditions.
These analyses showed that the difference between the minimal
group (M = 11.59, SD = 2.43) and control conditions (M = 13.90,
SD = 7.09) was significant in the exclusion condition, t(122) = 2.11,
P = 0.037, Cohen’s d = 0.44, 95% CI [.07–2.25], but not significant in
the inclusion condition (Mminimal group = 14.61, SDminimal group = 2.76
vs Mcontrol = 16.13, SDcontrol = 2.75; t(122) = 1.40, P = 0.163, Cohen’s
d = 0.44, 95% CI [−0.31–1.83]). It is not surprising that in the
exclusion condition, participants indicated that they thought
Player B received fewer balls in the minimal group condition,
because this was what actually happened (see results for the
percentage of ball tosses to Player B). Although this pattern
was not observed in Study 1, these follow-up comparisons thus
confirmed that the manipulation of inclusionary status was
successful.
Ball tosses to target. The 2 × 2 ANOVA showed a significant main
effect of inclusionary status, F(1, 118) = 11.05, P = 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.09, qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 118) = 4.51,
P = 0.036, partial η2 = 0.04 (see Table 2 for means and s.d.). In the
inclusion condition, group membership had no effect on tossing
behavior, t(122) = −0.65, P = 0.519, Cohen’s d = 0.17, 95% CI [−0.03–
0.01]. In the exclusion condition, however, the percentage of
participants’ ball tosses to Player B was lower in the minimal
group setting than in the control condition, t(122) = 2.34, P = 0.021,
Cohen’s d = 0.57, 95% CI [0.004–0.05]. Mimicking Study 1’s find-
ings, participants actively compensated for Player B’s exclusion
in the control condition, with their percentage of tosses exceed-
ing 50% significantly, t(30) = 12.20, P < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.50, 95%
CI [0.08–0.11], whereas such compensation was only marginally
observed in the minimal group condition, t(28) = 1.98, P = 0.058,
Cohen’s d = 0.42, 95% CI [−0.002–0.092].
Group identification and tosses to the target. We again correlated
difference scores between the perceived group membership of
Player A compared to Player B with the ball tosses to Player B.
This correlation was significantly negative in the minimal group
condition, (r = −0.21, P = 0.038), but non-significant in the control
condition (r = −0.15, P = 0.223), thereby replicating Study 1.
Discussion
In Study 2, a minimal group setting was created by automati-
cally assigning participants a color without any accompanying
information rather than having participants choose the color
themselves, as was done in Study 1. In line with the results
from Study 1, this minimal group setting again caused par-
ticipants to throw fewer balls to an out-group player to the
benefit of the in-group player. The correlational results, mim-
icking those of Study 1, revealed how greater identification with
the in-group excluder was again associated with a decrease
in throws to the excluded out-group target. Together, this pat-
tern of results across two studies points to the possibility of a
motivational conflict that participants might have experienced
between including the out-group member on the one hand
and favoring the in-group member on the other hand. Still, the
reliance on self-report measures and the fact that these assess-
ments were made only after the Cyberball game preclude strong
conclusions about the occurrence of such conflict. In a third neu-
roimaging study, we therefore further investigated whether cog-
nitive conflict arose during participants’ decisions to go along
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Table 2. Percentage of ball tosses to the excluded player as a function of inclusionary status and group membership (Study 2)
Inclusion Exclusion
M SD M SD
Minimal group 52.62%a 7.90 54.52%a 12.29
Control 51.18%a 8.75 59.80%b 4.47
Note: Means with different superscripts differ significantly across all cells (Ps < 0.05, analyzed with simple-effect analyses).
Study 3
Using a similar setup as in the previous studies, we measured
people’s brain activity using fMRI while they played the Cyberball
game involving or not the social exclusion of another player
when group membership was salient or not. Because our aim
was to establish whether motivational conflict would occur
when participants had to respond to social exclusion in an
intergroup setting, we focused our fMRI analyses specifically on
the roles of the dACC and dlPFC, as these regions have reliably
been shown to be associated with cognitive conflict (e.g. Van
Veen and Carter, 2006).
Method
Participants
Our sample was determined at a minimum of N = 40, based on
recent neuroimaging studies investigating the neural mecha-
nisms underlying social exclusion with a similar experimental
setup (Van der Meulen et al., 2016, 2017). The final sample con-
sisted of 45 healthy right-handed paid volunteers, who were
all students from Leiden University. Due to a technical error
during scanning, the data from two participants were lost. We
therefore analyzed the data from 43 participants (25 female, 18
male; Mage = 20.95, SDage = 1.86; age range 18–25). None reported
to have any history of neurological or psychiatric disorder and
all were medication-free. All participants gave written informed
consent for the study, and all procedures were approved by
the medical ethical committee of the Leiden University Medical
Center (LUMC).
Design
We used an fMRI-compatible experimental design with one
within-subjects factor with two levels (inclusionary status,
inclusion vs exclusion) and one between-subjects factor with
two levels (group membership, minimal group vs control).
Participants were randomly assigned to the two group mem-
bership conditions. We only manipulated group membership
in the exclusion game, not in the inclusion game, to avoid
habituation to the minimal group manipulation throughout
the two subsequent games. In the inclusion game, the three
players did not have a color. Our design was therefore not fully
factorial. It however still allowed us to compare the effects
of group membership (minimal group vs control) during the
exclusion game and the effects of inclusionary status (inclusion
vs exclusion) within the minimal group and control conditions
separately.
Procedure
After participants were welcomed and placed in the fMRI scan-
ner, they received instructions about Cyberball. Participants next
played two consecutive Cyberball games. In the first game, both
other players equally included the other player and the partici-
pant. This game was similar to the inclusion game of Studies 1
and 2, but the three players were not colored as to avoid habit-
uation to our minimal group manipulation. As in Studies 1 and
2, we assessed participants’ ball tosses to the target during the
game. After the game ended, participants reported the perceived
exclusion of the target, by indicating with their left and right
index fingers whether they thought the target received more or
fewer than 15 ball tosses (i.e. one-third of the total number of
ball tosses) from the other player.
Next, participants played the second Cyberball game, which
was explained to be with different people from the first game.
Now, one player was consistently excluded by the other player
(as in the exclusion games of Studies 1 and 2) in either a min-
imal group setting or control condition, similar to Studies 1
and 2 (see Figure 1A and B). We counterbalanced whether the
excluded player was Player A or B, to make sure that inclusion
vs exclusion behavior was not restricted to the left vs right
visual field. We again measured participants’ tossing behavior.
Following the game, participants again indicated whether they
thought the target received more or fewer than 15 ball tosses
from the other players. At the end, all participants were asked
what they thought the study was about. None of the participants
guessed the true purpose of the study or reported any doubts
about the cover story.
fMRI data acquisition
Scanning was performed on a 3.0 T Philips Achieva scanner at
the LUMC. Functional data were acquired using a T2∗-weighted
echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (echo time [TE] = 30 ms,
repetition time [TR] = 2200 ms, slice matrix = 80 × 80, slice
thickness = 2.75 mm, slice gap = 0.28 mm gap, field of view
[FOV] = 220 mm), during two fMRI runs which lasted for ∼5 min
each. At the end of the scan session, a high-resolution T2-
weighted anatomical scan (same slice prescription as EPI) was
collected.
fMRI data analysis
Data pre-processing and analysis were conducted with SPM8
software (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8)
implemented in MATLAB (MathWorks, Sherborn, MA). All
functional images were realigned and slice-time corrected using
the middle slice as reference. They were spatially normalized
to T1 templates and spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel
(8 mm, full width at half maximum). For motion, we used a
cutoff point of 3 mm. None of the participants exceeded this
threshold. A canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF)
was convolved at the onset of the ball tosses.
Analyses were carried out using the general linear model in
SPM8. Whereas the previous fMRI research on targets of exclu-






/scan/article-abstract/15/5/571/5841602 by guest on 02 July 2020
G.-J. Lelieveld et al. 577
focused on the brain mechanisms underlying throwing behav-
ior. We focused on throwing behavior, regardless of whether
this was to the excluder or the excluded target, because we
were interested in brain mechanisms underlying the decision
to throw to either one of players. We compared brain activity
during these events in the exclusion game (i.e. ExclusionThrow)
to the inclusion game (i.e. InclusionThrow), resulting in the
ExclusionThrow > InclusionThrow contrast and vice versa. For
these contrasts, we subsequently examined the moderating role
of group membership by comparing the minimal group condi-
tion to the control condition. Although we were less interested in
the brain mechanisms involved in the traditionally investigated
participant perspective of receiving vs not receiving the ball,
we nonetheless also compared the brain regions involved in
these events separately during the inclusion game (i.e. Inclu-
sionGet vs InclusionOut) and exclusion game (i.e. ExclusionGet
vs ExclusionOut), as depicted in Table 3.
We computed contrast parameter images for each partici-
pant and submitted them to second-level group analyses. At
the group level, we computed whole-brain contrasts between
conditions by performing one-sample t-tests, treating partici-
pants as a random effect. We further performed two-sample t-
tests to investigate the moderating role of group membership.
Results were considered significant at an uncorrected thresh-
old P < 0.001 with an extent threshold of 10 continuous voxels.
Thresholds were based on recommendations from Lieberman
and Cunningham (2009), to produce a desirable balance between
Type I and Type II errors. Table 3 reports which results remained
significant with an FDR P < 0.05 or FWE P < 0.05, >10 contiguous
voxel thresholds.
We extracted parameter estimates from the regions that were
identified in the whole-brain analyses using the MarsBaR tool-




Perceived exclusion of target. The logging of one participant’s esti-
mations failed due to a technical error, leaving 42 participants
for this analysis. A Chi-square test of their estimations showed
a significant effect of inclusionary status, χ2 (1, N = 84) = 14.42,
P < 0.001, ϕ = 0.41. Participants more often estimated targets to
have received fewer than 15 ball tosses in the exclusion game
(34 out of 42, 81.0%) than in the inclusion game (17 out of 42,
40.5%). Within the exclusion games, group membership did not
further affect these estimations, χ2 (1, N = 42) = 0.21, P = 0.706,
ϕ = 0.07.
Participants’ ball tosses to target. Planned comparisons of the
number of ball tosses during the two exclusion games showed
a significant difference between the minimal group and control
condition, t(86) = 2.46, P = 0.016, Cohen’s d = 0.68, 95% CI [0.55–
14.67]. Participants’ tosses to the exclusion target were more
frequent in the control condition than in the minimal group
condition, similar to Studies 1 and 2. In the control condition,
participants actively compensated for the target’s exclusion, as
their percentage of tosses toward the excluded target signifi-
cantly exceeded an even 50% distribution, t(18) = 7.50, P < 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 1.67, 95% CI [0.11–0.19]. Unlike in Studies 1 and 2,
participants in the minimal group condition also tossed the ball
to the exclusion target significantly more than 50%, t(23) = 2.66,
P = 0.014, Cohen’s d = 0.54, 95% CI [0.02–0.13].
fMRI results
Responses to exclusion
The ExclusionThrow > InclusionThrow contrast revealed acti-
vation in the dlPFC, which is depicted in Figure 2A and Table 3.
We also displayed ROI patterns for this dlPFC activation across
different conditions, as depicted in Figure 2B. A paired t-test of
the parameter estimates revealed that in the exclusion condition
(where we manipulated group membership), dlPFC activation
was greater for participants in the minimal group condition
compared to the control condition, t(86) = 2.04, P = 0.045, Cohen’s
d = 0.50, 95% CI [0.002–0.20]. To further examine the effects of
group membership, we conducted a two-sample t-test compar-
ing ExclusionThrow > InclusionThrow for the Minimal Group >
Control contrast. This revealed significantly greater activation in
the dlPFC in the minimal group condition compared to the con-
trol condition (see Figure 3, Table 3 for all relevant statistics). The
reverse contrasts (Control > Minimal group and InclusionThrow
> ExclusionThrow) did not reveal any significant activation.
None of the whole-brain contrasts revealed increased activation
in the dACC.
Brain–behavior correlations. To investigate whether the activa-
tion in the dlPFC was correlated to participants’ throwing behav-
ior in the Cyberball game, we extracted parameter estimates of
our dlPFC region in the ExclusionThrow-InclusionThrow con-
trast and correlated these with participant’s ball tosses to the
target across all conditions. As Figure 2C shows, this correlation
was significantly positive, (r = 0.21, P = 0.048), indicating that the
stronger the dlPFC activity, the more frequently participants
threw the ball to the excluded target.
Discussion
Consistent with those of Studies 1 and 2, the findings of Study 3
showed that participants actively included an excluded target in
the absence of a minimal group setting. They more often chose
not to compensate in a minimal group setting, where an in-group
member excluded an out-group target. The fMRI results revealed
increased activation in the dlPFC during participants’ tossing
behavior in the exclusion game compared to the inclusion game,
suggesting that overall, they experienced greater conflict when
a fellow player was being excluded. Importantly, however, this
activation was stronger in the presence than in the absence of a
minimal group setting. This suggests that participants’ throwing
decisions while witnessing social exclusion employed greater
cognitive control when the exclusion was initiated by an in-
group member and the target was an out-group member than
when group membership was not made salient. This occurred
perhaps to resolve the conflict between two opposing motives,
namely, to include others, and to favor the in-group. The results
further showed that dlPFC activation correlated positively to
inclusion of the target across exclusion conditions. The stronger
the dlPFC activity, the more frequently participants threw the
ball to the excluded target, suggesting that cognitive control
occurred primarily when participants decided to include the tar-
get (rather than reciprocate the excluder), further strengthening
our conflicting motives account.
Taken together, the results of these three studies provided
converging evidence that differences in group membership
influence responses to social exclusion of another individual.
Still, the use of the modified three-player Cyberball game also
created some limitations. In all three studies, the exclusion






/scan/article-abstract/15/5/571/5841602 by guest on 02 July 2020
578 Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2020, Vol. 15, No. 5
Table 3. Brain regions revealed by whole-brain contrasts, including MNI coordinates. Peak voxels reported at P < 0.001 uncorrected, at least 10
contiguous voxels (voxel size was 3.0 × 3.0 × 3.0 mm)
Anatomical region L/R Voxels Z MNI coordinates
x y z
ExclusionThrow > InclusionThrow
Dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex L 239 4.66 -27 41 31 a
4.59 -24 53 25 a
4.34 -18 20 34 a
InclusionThrow > ExclusionThrow
Visual cortex L/R 4874 4.94 39 -85 -8 b
4.92 48 -76 4 b
4.73 45 -46 -23 b
[ExclusionThrow > InclusionThrow] Minimal Group >
[ExclusionThrow > InclusionThrow] Control
Dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex L 21 3.70 -24 41 28
3.57 -15 50 25
ExclusionGet – ExclusionOut
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex L/R 580 6.48 -3 -4 52 b
5.37 -6 11 40 b
4.96 -6 17 34 b
Motor cortex L 661 6.95 -42 -22 58 b
6.31 -30 -16 64 b
5.19 -54 -19 46 b
ExclusionOut – ExclusionGet
Visual cortex L 18 3.89 -39 -16 37 a
R 90 5.74 15 -85 4 b
3.43 6 -82 25 b
Motor cortex L/R 539 6.01 27 -25 64 a
5.61 36 -22 49 a
5.38 -12 -28 67 a
InclusionGet > InclusionOut
Anterior cingulate cortex L/R 5282 7.12 -6 2 49 b
Temporoparietal junction 6.59 -54 -22 34 b
Motor cortex 6.91 -33 -10 54 b
Insula L/R 1146 6.70 39 14 7 b
6.56 45 11 7 b
6.51 36 17 10 b
InclusionOut > InclusionGet
Visual cortex L 53 6.79 -12 -88 1 b
R 187 6.79 15 -85 4 b
6.05 9 -82 22 b
5.80 12 -82 31 b
aThe results remained significant with an FDR-corrected threshold of P < 0.05, with an extent threshold of 10 contiguous voxels.
bThe results remained significant with an FWE-corrected threshold of P < 0.05, with an extent threshold of 10 contiguous voxels.
excluder (and vice versa). That is, participants excluded one
player by throwing the ball to the other player, who was therefore
automatically included in the game. With such a design, it
is thus impossible to dissociate people’s exclusion from their
inclusion decisions. To address this, we therefore conducted
a final study, where we employed a team-selection paradigm
without such a direct relation between the inclusion of one
person and the exclusion of another person. Moreover, to further
examine to what extent our observed pattern of findings could
be explained by perceived group membership vs reciprocity
norms, in Study 4 we directly measured both constructs as
potential motivations for participants’ responses to the social
exclusion of others. Whereas the reciprocity norm did not seem
to motivate participants’ throwing decisions in the absence of
a minimal group setting in the previous three studies, these
measures would allow us to obtain more direct evidence that
participants’ responses to social exclusion within a minimal
group setting are primarily motivated by their concerns over
group membership. In addition, testing our ideas further with a
new task allowed us to extend our findings to a different group
context, namely, team selection.
Study 4
In Study 4, we used a task where participants could adjust
the composition of a team by excluding another team member.
We adjusted the paradigm from Doolaard et al. (2020). In their
paradigm participants completed a competitive group task as a
group in which the goal was to estimate which of the two dot
clouds contain the most dots. Based on the performance of the
fellow team members, participants could decide to exclude team
members. In our version of the task, we did not give participants
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Fig. 2. (A) Whole-brain results for regions active in the ExclusionThrow > InclusionThrow contrast (threshold at P < 0.05, FDR-corrected). Activation was detected in
the dlPFC (MNI coordinates: x = −27, y = 41, z = 31). (B) Parameter estimates plotted for the minimal group and control conditions of the exclusion game and for all
participants of the inclusion game (we did not manipulate group membership in the inclusion condition). (C) Activation in the dlPFC correlated positively with the
percentage of throws to the excluded player, across all conditions.
Fig. 3. Whole-brain results of the two sample t-test for regions active in the Exclu-
sionThrow > InclusionThrow contrast for Minimal Group > Control (threshold at
P < 0.001, uncorrected). Activation was detected in the dlPFC (MNI coordinates:
x = −24, y = 47, z = 28).
played a practice round, and before the actual game started,
participants could choose to adjust the composition of the team
by excluding a potential player. We manipulated the group mem-
bership of the players in a similar way as in the first three
studies, by assigning different colors to the different players to
create minimal groups.
In the first three studies, we showed that differences in
group membership led participants to throw fewer balls to the
excluded target, but only when another player initiated the
exclusion. When the other player did not initiate the exclusion,
differences in group membership did not lead participants to
throw fewer balls to the target. In the current study, we aimed
to extend these findings. To do so, we varied the decision order
in which participants could choose to exclude another player or
not. One-half of the participants were the first in the team to
make this decision (the initiate condition). Participants in this
condition could thus initiate the exclusion of another player.
Based on the findings from the first three studies, we expected
that differences in group membership would not lead partic-
ipants to initiate the exclusion of an out-group player more
than an in-group player. The other half of the participants only
made the decision to exclude another player after two other
team members had already made their decision (the respond
condition). In this condition, these other two players always
initiated the exclusion of a fourth player, who was to make their
choice following the participant. Participants in this condition
thus responded to the exclusion of one player that was initi-
ated by two other players. Based on the first three studies, we
expected that group membership would influence participants’
exclusion decisions in this condition, such that participants
would more often decide to go along with the exclusion initiated
by the two other players of an out-group rather than an in-
group target. We pre-registered the study’s experimental setup
and main hypotheses at https://osf.io/529zf.
Method
Design and participants
The study used a 2 (decision order, initiate vs respond) × 2 (group
membership, minimal group vs control) between-participants
design. The previous work using the same paradigm included
40 participants per cell, based on a power analysis that indi-
cated a significant difference with an alpha level of 0.05, a
power of β = 0.80 and an effect size of ϕ = 0.31 (Doolaard et al.,
2020). Because we incorporated an additional manipulation, we
decided to increase the sample size and aimed to collect 50
participants per cell. Due to a logging error, the data from three
participants were lost, leaving the data of 197 participants (130
females; Mage = 37.71, SD = 12.46) for our analyses. Participants
were recruited through the online research platform Prolific Aca-
demic (https://www.prolific.ac/). To make sure the participants
understood our task, we selected only people from the UK and
who were native English speakers. All procedures were approved
by the ethical committee of the Institute of Psychology of Leiden
University.
Procedure
After giving informed consent, participants were explained that
the experiment consisted of a computerized group task, in which
participants allegedly formed a team with three other partici-
pants. In reality the participants completed the task alone, and
the responses of their team members were programmed before-
hand. Before starting the actual task, participants learned that
each player would be represented by an avatar of a specific color.
Depending on the position of their first initial in the alphabet,
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Fig. 4. Screenshot of the dot estimation task. Participants selected the picture
with most dots.
initial, participants were presented with their avatar and learned
that their avatar was assigned the color orange.
Participants were then informed that together with their
team members, they were going to perform a task in which each
participant had to indicate as fast and accurately as possible
which of two pictures (see Figure 4) contained the most dots
(a procedure similar to the dot-estimation task; see Gerard and
Hoyt, 1974). They learned that they played this game against
another team and that the team with the highest average team
score would win. Participants learned that all team members
would first play a practice round of 10 trials. In each trial par-
ticipants had 10 s to make their decision, after which the next
trial was presented. In between trials participants did not receive
any feedback about whether they correctly answered the trial or
not. Even though participants could not interact with the other
members of the group (to avoid that differences in content and
valence of the interaction would influence their decisions), we
emphasized that like them, the other members of their group
also completed the practice round. This was done to create
the feeling that participants were really part of a team with
which they competed against another group. After the practice
round, participants did not receive any feedback on their team
members’ or own performance, to make sure performance did
not influence their decisions.
Participants were then told that each team member was
asked to indicate with whom they wanted to be in the team in
the next round. They were informed that they could choose to be
in a team with three or four players. Participants were informed
that not the absolute but the average team score achieved in
the game would determine whether they would win, and so
there was no advantage of choosing to play with four over
three team members. Participants then saw a picture with four
avatars depicting themselves and their three team members
(Figure 5A–D). Similar to the first three studies, in the minimal
group condition, two team members were assigned the same
color as the participant, and one team member was assigned a
different color (see Figure 5A and C). In the control condition, all
four team members had a different color (see Figure 5B and D).
Depending on the decision order, participants were then told
when they could choose with which players they wanted to be
in the team. Participants could either initiate the exclusion of
one of the other players (initiate condition) or respond to the
exclusion of a player initiated by the others (respond condi-
tion). In the initiate condition (see Figure 5A and B), participants
learned they were Player 1 and were the first to choose their
team members, after which Players 2, 3 and 4 would take their
turns. In the respond condition (see Figure 5C and D), partici-
pants learned they were Player 3 and that they could choose their
team members after (seeing the choice of) Players 1 and 2 and
before Player 4. Players 1 and 2 would thus make their selection
first and always excluded Player 4.
Participants in all conditions were instructed to click once
on a player’s icon if they wanted to select that player for the
team and twice on the icon of a player if they did not want to
have that player in the team for the game. They learned that
players who were excluded would receive the message that they
had not been chosen to be part of the team and that these
players would continue with a different task. This information
was added, so that being excluded would not be perceived as an
advantage (i.e. finish the experiment early). After making their
selection to in-/exclude, participants answered a questionnaire
where they had to indicate on a seven-point scale (1 = ‘absolutely
not’, 7 = ‘absolutely’) to what extent they agreed with statements
about (1) the conflict they experienced, (2) the extent to which
reciprocity and group membership motivated their choice and
(3) how aversive they were to exclusion.
We measured conflict with two statements (‘I felt torn when
deciding on the team composition’ and ‘I experienced conflict
when selecting the team players’). Responses were averaged
into a single index of conflict (α = 0.91). We measured group
membership as a motive for participants’ choice with two state-
ments (‘My decision to select a player for the team was based on
whether or not the player belonged to my group’ and ‘My deci-
sion to exclude a player from the team was based on whether or
not the player belonged to my group’). Responses were averaged
into a single index of group membership (α = 0.81).
Reciprocity was measured only in the respond conditions,
because there was no behavior to reciprocate in the initiate
condition. We measured reciprocity by asking participants to
indicate to what extent they agreed with two statements (‘I did
what I did because I was thankful the players before me chose
me in their team’ and ‘I based my decision on whether or not
the players before me chose me in their team’). Responses were
averaged into a single index of reciprocity (α = 0.81).
We measured exclusion aversion with two statements (‘I did
not like excluding one of the players from the team’ and ‘I
found it difficult to exclude one of the players from the team’).
Responses were averaged into a single index of exclusion aver-
sion (α = 0.79). Finally, to check the manipulation of group mem-
bership, we asked participants to what extent they agreed with
the statement ‘Player X was a member of my group’, with X being
Player 2, 3 or 4 in turn in the initiate condition and Player 1, 2 or
4 in the respond condition. After answering this question about
each of the other players, participants were thoroughly debriefed
and were paid £0.88.
Results
Manipulation check
To establish that our minimal group manipulation had been suc-
cessful, the manipulation check question to what extent ‘Player
X was a member of my group’ had to show differences between
the group membership conditions, in particular for Player 4.
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the ratings of Player 4 yielded only a main
effect of group membership, F(1, 193) = 23.57, P < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.11, but not of decision order, F(1, 193) = 1.41, P = 0.237, par-
tial η2 = 0.01, and no interaction, F(1, 193) = 0.65, P = 0.420, partial
η2 = 0.00. This indicates that irrespective of whether participants
were first or followed in their team composition decision, Player
4 was considered to be less of a group member in the minimal
group condition (M = 3.52, SD = 2.35) than in the control condition
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Fig. 5. The manipulation of exclusion decision and group membership used in Study 4. Participants were asked whether or not they wanted to adjust the group
composition in the presence of a minimal group manipulation (A and C) or in the absence of one (B and D). Moreover, they either had to initiate the decision (initiate
condition; A and B) or had to respond to the decision made by other players (respond condition; C and D).
We also examined participants’ responses to the manipula-
tion check for the other two players. Note that in the minimal
group condition and the control condition, participants were
informed that the other three players—which besides Player 4
also included Players 2 and 3 (in the initiate condition) or Players
1 and 2 (in the respond condition)—were part of their team.
It would therefore make sense that participants would overall
give high ratings to this question. Indeed, although the means
were higher in the minimal group condition (M = 6.05, SD = 1.61
and M = 6.00, SD = 1.51) than in the control condition (M = 5.65,
SD = 1.97 and M = 5.82, SD = 1.56), 2 (group membership) × 2 (deci-
sion order) ANOVAs did not yield any main or interactions effects
on these ratings, Fs < 2.49, Ps > 0.12.
Exclusion behavior
To examine the exclusion behavior across conditions, we first
conducted a logistic regression analysis with group member-
ship (minimal group vs control) and decision order (initiate vs
respond) as independent variables and participants’ exclusion
(yes/no) of the target (Player 4) as the dependent variable. This
analysis yielded main effects of group membership, Wald’s χ2
(1, N = 197) = 13.67, P < 0.001, and of decision order, Wald’s χ2 (1,
N = 197) = 13.67, P < 0.001. The interaction was not significant,
Wald’s χ2 (1, N = 197) = 0.44, P = 0.51. We also analyzed our results
with another widely used method to study the interaction effects
with a dichotomous dependent variable: the linear probability
model (Wooldridge, 2013). A linear probability model is a special
case of a binomial regression model, where the probability of
observing an event or not (in this case whether participants
excluded or not) is treated as depending on one or more explana-
tory variables. For a detailed analysis of the difference between
the linear probability model and binary logistic model, see Helle-
vik (2009). When analyzing our results with the linear probability
model, we do find a significant interaction effect. Results show
a significant main effect of decision order (β = −0.27, P < 0.001)
and of group membership (β = −0.27, P < 0.001), as well as a
significant interaction effect (β = 0.17, P = 0.01).
We then performed follow-up Chi-square tests to investigate
the differences between specific conditions. Because the logis-
tic regression interaction effect was not significant, we used
a Bonferroni correction and divided P = 0.05 by the number of
Chi-square tests we performed (i.e. 6). The follow-up Chi-square
tests were thus considered significant when P < 0.008. In line
with our hypotheses, these results showed that participants
who responded to the exclusion more often chose to exclude
the target in the minimal group condition (22 out of 48, 46.8%)
than participants in the control condition (6 out of 50, 12.0%),
χ2 (1, N = 197) = 13.74, P < 0.001, ϕ = –0.37, as well as compared
to participants in the minimal group condition who initiated
the choice (6 out of 50, 12.0%), χ2 (1, N = 197) = 13.74, P < 0.001,
ϕ = −0.37 and participants in the control condition who initiated
the choice (2 out of 49, 4.1%), χ2 (1, N = 197) = 22.70, P < 0.001,
ϕ = −0.48. Chi-square tests between the other three conditions
did not yield any significant differences (Ps > 0.27).
Decision conflict
A 2 × 2 ANOVA of the conflict ratings yielded a main effect of
group membership, F(1, 193) = 12.70, P < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.06,
and of decision order, F(1, 193) = 63.42, P < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.25.
1 In all four studies there were no differences in relevant demographics
between the different groups. Gender and age were equally distributed
across conditions.2We also examined whether participants chose to
exclude the other two players who were not the target (Players 2 and 3
in the initiate condition and Players 1 and 2 in the respond condition).
In none of the conditions, more than 3 participants chose to exclude







/scan/article-abstract/15/5/571/5841602 by guest on 02 July 2020
582 Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2020, Vol. 15, No. 5
These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction,
F(1, 193) = 9.27, P = 0.003, partial η2 = 0.05. Planned comparisons
showed that participants in the minimal group condition
who responded to the exclusion experienced more conflict
(M = 4.68, SD = 1.44) than participants in the control condition
who responded to the exclusion (M = 3.16, SD = 1.99, t(193) = 4.66,
P < 0.001, d = 0.88, 95% CI [−2.16 to −0.88]), who in turn
experienced more conflict than participants who initiated
the choice in the minimal group condition (M = 2.15, SD = 1.37,
t(193) = 3.14, P = 0.002, d = 1.80, 95% CI [−1.67 to −0.35]), and in
the control condition (M = 2.03, SD = 1.57, t(193) = 3.49, P = 0.001,
d = 0.63, 95% CI [−1.79 to −0.47]). Participants in the minimal
group condition who initiated the choice and participants in
the control condition who initiated the choice did not differ
significantly in the level of experienced conflict, t(193) = 0.37,
P = 0.713, d = 0.08, 95% CI [−0.52 to –0.76]).
Group membership motive
A 2 × 2 ANOVA of the group membership ratings yielded a main
effect of group membership, F(1, 193) = 4.43, P = 0.037, partial
η2 = 0.02, and of decision order, F(1, 193) = 13.38, P < 0.001, par-
tial η2 = 0.07. These main effects were qualified by a significant
interaction, F(1, 193) = 9.62, P = 0.002, partial η2 = 0.05. Planned
comparisons confirmed our predictions that participants who
responded to the exclusion indicated that the group member-
ship of the players motivated their team-selection decision more
in the minimal group condition (M = 3.74, SD = 1.87) than partic-
ipants in the control condition (M = 2.50, SD = 1.51, t(193) = 3.67,
P < 0.001, d = 0.73, 95% CI [−1.91 to −0.57]), or participants who
initiated the choice in the minimal group condition (M = 2.13,
SD = 1.61, t(193) = 4.77, P < 0.001, d = 0.92, 95% CI [−2.28 to −0.94]),
or the control condition (M = 2.37, SD = 1.68, t(193) = 4.04, P < 0.001,
d = 0.77, 95% CI [−2.04 to −0.70]). The other conditions again did
not differ from one another (Ps > 0.69).
Reciprocity motive
Planned comparisons of the reciprocity ratings yielded no signif-
icant effect of group membership, t(96) = 0.15, P = 0.882, d = 0.03,
95% CI [−0.53 to 0.46], confirming that the motive to reciprocate
the other players did not vary across the minimal group (M = 2.57,
SD = 1.27) and control conditions (M = 2.61, SD = 1.20).
Exclusion aversion
A 2 × 2 ANOVA of participants’ exclusion aversion ratings yielded
no main effects of group membership, F(1, 193) = 0.06, P = 0.814,
partial η2 = 0.00, or decision order, F(1, 193) = 1.29, P = 0.257, par-
tial η2 = 0.01, and no interaction, F(1, 193) = 0.36, P = 0.550, partial
η2 = 0.00. Across conditions participants indicated to be relatively
exclusion averse, with an overall mean score that was above the
midpoint of the seven-point scale (M = 4.69, SD = 1.94).
Mediated moderation
We explored whether the interaction effect of group member-
ship and decision order on participants’ exclusion behavior
would be mediated by experienced conflict and/or by group
membership motives. To examine this, we performed a
mediated moderation analysis (Muller et al., 2005). To test this,
we used Hayes’s (2018) PROCESS bootstrapping command with
10 000 iterations (model 8) to test the indirect effect (Preacher
et al., 2007) of the interaction term of group membership and
decision order on exclusion behavior through experienced
conflict and/or group membership motives (controlling for
the unique effects of group membership and decision order).
The analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of group
membership motives on exclusion behavior (the 95% CI did
not contain zero, a × b = 0.66, SE = 0.32, 95% CI [0.20–1.46]), but
not of experienced conflict (the 95% CI did contain zero,
a × b = −.13, SE = 0.27, 95% CI [−0.73–0.37]). The findings thus
suggest that group membership motives can explain the effects
of group membership on participants’ decisions in response
to the exclusion by the other players. However, because of the
exploratory nature of this analysis, these findings should be
interpreted with caution.
Discussion
Employing a different paradigm, within a different group setting,
the findings of Study 4 further supported the results of our
first three studies that a simple minimal group manipulation
made participants compensate less for the exclusion of an out-
group target. When deciding on whom to select for a team,
participants more often decided to go along with the exclusion
by another player in the presence than in the absence of a
minimal group. When participants initiated the decision, they
excluded less often, regardless of the presence or absence of a
minimal group. We investigated several motives for participant’s
choices. Self-report ratings of experienced conflict showed that
responding to the exclusion of an out-group member that was
initiated by an in-group member increased the experience of
conflict, converging with the fMRI results of Study 3. In line
with these findings, the results showed that even when partic-
ipants decided to go along with the exclusion of an out-group
target, they still indicated (across all conditions) to be exclusion
averse. Moreover, when participants responded to the exclusion
of an out-group player, they also indicated that their decision
to exclude or not was based on whether or not the player
belonged to their group. Finally, reciprocity motives did not play
a role in participants’ responses to social exclusion. Mediated
moderation analyses showed that although experienced con-
flict was higher when participants excluded more, conflict did
not predict exclusion behavior significantly. Therefore, though
conflict occurs, it may not be the essential mechanism that
drives the exclusion behavior. Instead, the analysis showed that
participants’ exclusion decisions were motivated by the group
membership of the players.
General discussion
In three behavioral studies and one behavioral fMRI study using
different experimental paradigms, we investigated the effect
of group membership on participants’ responses to the social
exclusion of others, by varying the absence or presence of a
minimal group setting. In the first three studies, we employed a
modified version of the three-player Cyberball game and exam-
ined participants’ ball tosses to an excluded target in the absence
or presence of a minimal group setting. In these studies par-
ticipants actively included an excluded target in the absence
of a minimal group setting (i.e. increased the number of tosses
toward), but chose not to intervene when an in-group member
excluded an out-group target (i.e. distributing their tosses more
or less evenly). Although participants did not fully exclude the
out-group target in this case, the result of their indecisive behav-
ior was that, compared to the other players, the target received
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moreover showed that the more participants identified with the
excluder than the excluded target in a minimal group setting,
the less frequently they compensated by again throwing the ball
to the excluded target, which suggests that participants experi-
enced a motivational conflict between favoring the in-group and
avoiding the exclusion of the out-group target.
Note though that in the three-player Cyberball setting of our
first three studies, throwing the ball to the excluder automati-
cally ruled out a throw to the excluded player, making it difficult
to disentangle inclusion of the in-group member from exclu-
sion of the out-group member. In a fourth study, we therefore
employed a different paradigm that allowed us to dissociate
these responses. In this paradigm, participants could adjust the
composition of a team by in- vs excluding players from an initial
group of four, while we again manipulated group membership
through the absence or presence of a minimal group setting.
The results of this study showed that whereas participants were
exclusion averse in the absence of a minimal group setting,
they decided to actively exclude out-group targets when this
was initiated by an in-group member. Mediated moderation
analyses showed that group membership motives accounted for
this decision to go along with the exclusion. In addition, Study
4 allowed us to replicate the Cyberball findings of the first three
studies in a different group setting, namely, team selection.
In addition to self-reports and behavioral measures, our third
study also employed neuroimaging that allowed us to assess
through more implicit measures to what extent participants
experienced conflicting motives while deciding to exclude or
not. These neuroimaging findings revealed that during the
exclusion game compared to the inclusion game, activation
increased in the dlPFC, a brain region widely associated with
the resolution of cognitive conflict (Van Veen and Carter, 2006).
Importantly, this relative activation was even stronger in the
presence than in the absence of a minimal group setting,
suggesting that participants’ throwing decisions following
exclusion concurred with greater cognitive control in response
to conflict when the exclusion was initiated by an in-group
member than in the absence of a minimal group setting. Further
analyses moreover revealed that dlPFC activation was positively
correlated to compensation. The stronger the dlPFC activity,
the more frequently the participants threw the ball to the
excluded target, suggesting that cognitive conflict was primarily
present when participants decided to override the tendency to
reciprocate the excluder and instead again include the exclusion
target. Finally, the self-report measures in Study 4 supported
the fMRI findings, showing that participants experienced more
conflict when they responded to the exclusion of a target in the
presence than in the absence of a minimal group manipulation.
Moreover, when participants decided to go along with the
exclusion of an out-group target, they still indicated to be
exclusion averse, suggesting that different motives have affected
participant’s decisions.
Although together these findings suggest that participants
experienced conflict when they responded to the exclusion of an
out-group target initiated by an in-group member, the mediation
analysis in Study 4 showed that this self-reported conflict was
not associated with their exclusion decisions. Note though that
participants experienced self-reported conflict only after the
team-selection task had already been completed. Perhaps then,
through their decision, they had already resolved this conflict,
irrespective of whether this involved going along with the exclu-
sion of the out-group target or not. Experienced conflict may
therefore not have affected participants’ exclusion decisions.
Instead, our mediation analysis showed that whether or not
participants went along with the exclusion of an out-group
target could be explained by group membership motives. That
is, participants’ decision to exclude a player or not was based on
whether or not the player belonged to their group.
Our neuroimaging findings from Study 3 showed no associa-
tion of participants’ responses to social exclusion with the ACC,
even though this was one of our regions of interest. The previous
work on the involvement of the ACC and dlPFC in conflict
adaptation suggests that the ACC is primarily associated with
conflict monitoring whereas the dlPFC is more involved with
conflict resolution (Kerns et al., 2004; Kerns, 2006; Smith et al.,
2019). More recent work using lesion patients showed that while
the dlPFC plays a fundamental role in behavioral adaptation in
response to conflict, the ACC is sensitive to the level of conflict,
but is not crucial for handling conflict (Boschin et al., 2017). Along
those lines, the dlPFC may have guided participants’ ball tosses
more than the ACC. At this point, the above interpretation is
still speculative in nature, and future research is required to
further establish the role of the dlPFC in participant’s responses
to exclusion in our studies.
Limitations and implications
A limitation of our first three studies was that participants were
faced with a dilemma where the inclusion of one player was
directly linked to the exclusion of the other player. That is, when
participants decided to throw the ball to the out-group target,
they at the same time excluded their in-group member, and
vice versa. In daily life, many decisions involve such dilemmas
(e.g. whom to work with on an assignment, whom to pass the
ball to in a game of soccer, whom to talk to at a party). We
were therefore specifically interested in how people deal with
this tension between the inclusion of one person and at the
same time the exclusion of another person and how group
membership affects this decision-making process. However, to
disentangle these decisions, we also replicated our findings with
a different paradigm, where participants responded to social
exclusion in a situation without a direct relation between the
exclusion of one player and the inclusion of another.
Another limitation is the focus on social exclusion dynam-
ics in relatively small groups. In the current studies, we mea-
sured people’s responses to the social exclusion of others in a
three-person (Studies 1–3) or a four-person (Study 4) interaction.
We, however, have no reason to expect that our findings are
restricted to these smaller groups. Previous research has shown
that even in larger groups, participants still notice and respond
to the exclusion of a fellow group member (Jones et al., 2019).
Future research could investigate to what extent group mem-
bership also plays a moderating role in the responses to social
exclusion in larger groups.
Our mediation analyses in Study 4 showed that participants’
decision to exclude a player or not was based on whether or not
the player belonged to their group. However, in the absence of a
direct comparison of the participants’ attitudes toward in-group
vs out-group players, it is difficult to conclude whether in-group
favoritism or out-group derogation explains participant’s exclu-
sion behavior in our studies. It is, however, important to note
that whereas group membership affected participants’ reactions
to social exclusion, it did not affect participants’ ball tosses in
the inclusion game (in Studies 1 and 2). If participants by default
had the intention to exclude an out-group member, our min-
imal group manipulation would have resulted in participants
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inclusionary status (i.e. in both the inclusion and exclusion con-
ditions). Moreover, in Study 4 we showed that when participants
were the first to decide, they rarely decided to exclude the out-
group target. Only when the other players initiated the exclusion,
participants decided to exclude the target. Together, these find-
ings thus more likely reflect in-group favoritism (including the
in-group member; Greenwald and Pettigrew, 2014) rather than
out-group derogation (excluding the out-group target; Yamagishi
and Kiyonari, 2000; Halevy et al., 2008).
Participants in our four studies compensated less for the
exclusion of a target when the target was an out-group member
than when group membership was not made salient. Although
these findings fit with literature demonstrating that people are
less cooperative with out-group members than with in-group
members (Goette et al., 2006; Balliet et al., 2014), and share
fewer resources with out-group members (Chen and Li, 2009;
Baldassarri and Grossman, 2013), they diverge from a recent
four-player Cyberball study involving adolescents (Vrijhof et al.,
2016). In this study it was found that, regardless of whether the
excluded target was an in- or out-group member, adolescents
actively included the excluded target. One explanation for the
differences between their findings and our own results could
be the difference in age groups. Perhaps our adult participants
were more affected by the minimal group manipulation than
the adolescent participants. Another explanation could be that
variations in design and procedure explain the differences with
Vrijhof et al. (2016). Because all participants in their study also
played four other versions of the Cyberball game, where group
membership was manipulated differently or not at all, partici-
pants’ behavior in the fifth game (which resembled our current
studies) may have been influenced by the norm that had already
emerged during the four previous games. Future research could
examine whether our findings among adults would hold up in
a design that more closely resembles Vrijhof et al. (2016) or,
reversely, in adolescents when the design more closely resem-
bles that of our Studies 1–3. Indeed, their findings did reveal
that adolescents were showing greater empathic concern for
in-group compared to out-group players, suggesting that the
minimal group manipulation did affect their affective responses.
Somewhat unexpected, and unlike in Cyberball Studies 1 and
2, the participants in Cyberball Study 3 tossed the ball to the
exclusion target significantly more than 50% in the minimal
group condition, thus compensating the exclusion by the other
player. Because our neuroimaging-compatible setup required
that all participants first played an inclusion game (without a
group membership manipulation) before they proceeded with
the exclusion game, they may have been more inclined to trans-
fer this inclusion norm to the secondary exclusion game (much
like the adolescents in the study by Vrijhof et al., 2016). The
within-subjects design of Study 3 may thus have weakened the
effect of our minimal group manipulation. Future research could
investigate whether the differences between the third and the
previous two Cyberball studies can be explained by the transfer
of an inclusion norm across games.
Conclusion
Most research on social exclusion has focused strongly on
its detrimental effects on victims (Williams, 2007). In the last
decade, however, research has begun to also examine the sources
of exclusion (for a special issue, see, e.g. Volume 155, Issue 5 of
the Journal of Social Psychology) and, more specifically, the actors
involved. As a result, new paradigms have been developed to
investigate the actors of social exclusion. The current studies
add to this emerging research perspective by focusing on
individuals who respond to social exclusion that is initiated by
other group members (see also Riem et al., 2013; Van der Meulen
et al., 2016, 2017; Vrijhof et al., 2016) and further underline the
importance of taking the group dynamics into account when
examining the emergence of social exclusion (Nezlek et al., 2012;
Poulsen and Carmon, 2015).
The current research is the first to show that when in-
group members initiate the exclusion of an out-group member,
either people choose not to intervene and consequently fail
to adequately compensate for this exclusion (Studies 1–3) or
people choose to go along with the exclusion as to favor their
in-group but experience increased levels of conflict (Study 4).
Irrespective of whether people act in a more passive manner
or choose to actively jump on the ‘bad’wagon, the consequence
of their behavior is relative exclusion of the target. Our findings
thus stress the importance of involving all members of a group
when studying social exclusion behavior, according with social–
ecological theories highlighting the role of peers, colleagues,
teachers, and families (Swearer and Espelage, 2004; Williams,
2007). Viewing social exclusion as a group dynamic, rather than
a social interaction between an actor and victim dyad, allows
educators and researchers to think about prevention and inter-
vention efforts that include all individuals within a group, as
minimal as this group may be.
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